Recommender system is an important component of many web services to help users locate items that match their interests. Several studies showed that recommender systems are vulnerable to poisoning aacks, in which an aacker injects fake data to a recommender system such that the system makes recommendations as the aacker desires. However, these poisoning aacks are either agnostic to recommendation algorithms or optimized to recommender systems (e.g., association-rule-based or matrix-factorization-based recommender systems) that are not graph-based. Like associationrule-based and matrix-factorization-based recommender systems, graph-based recommender system is also deployed in practice, e.g., eBay, Huawei App Store (a big app store in China). However, how to design optimized poisoning aacks for graph-based recommender systems is still an open problem.
INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data, a fundamental challenge is to locate the data that are relevant to a particular user. Recommender systems aim to address this challenge: given a user's historical behavior and social data, a recommender system nds the data that match the user's preference. Indeed, recommender systems are widely deployed by web services (e.g., YouTube, Amazon, and Google News) to recommend users relevant items such as products, videos, and news. In particular, collaborative ltering based recommender systems, which analyze the correlations between users' historical behavior data for making recommendations, are widely deployed due to their eectiveness and generality. Depending on the techniques used to capture the correlations between users' behavior data, collaborative ltering based recommender systems can further include matrixfactorization-based [17] , association-rule-based [6, 22] , and graphbased [7] recommender systems. For instance, matrix-factorizationbased recommender systems are deployed by Netix to recommend movies, association-rule-based recommender systems are deployed by YouTube to recommend videos [6] , and graph-based recommender systems are deployed by eBay [25, 26] and Huawei App Store (a big app store in China) [12, 13] .
It is commonly believed that recommender systems recommend users items that match their personal interests. However, several studies [19-21, 24, 35] have demonstrated that recommender systems are vulnerable to poisoning aacks, which inject fake data to a recommender system such that the recommender system makes recommendations as an aacker desires. For instance, an aacker can inject fake users with carefully craed fake rating scores to a recommender system such that a target item is recommended to as many users as possible. Conventional poisoning aacks [19, 21, 24] (also known as shilling aacks) are agnostic to recommendation algorithms, i.e., they are not optimized to a certain type of recommender systems. erefore, such aacks oen achieve suboptimal performance when the recommendation algorithm is known. To address this limitation, recent studies [20, 35] proposed poisoning aacks that were optimized for a particular type of recommender systems. For instance, Li et al. [20] proposed poisoning aacks optimized for matrix-factorization-based recommender systems, while Yang et al. [35] proposed poisoning aacks optimized for association-rule-based recommender systems. However, how to design optimized poisoning aacks to graph-based recommender systems is still an open problem.
In this work, we aim to design poisoning aacks for graphbased recommender systems [7, 12, 13, 25, 26] . A graph-based recommender system uses a user preference graph to represent users' rating scores to items. In the graph, a node is a user or an item, an edge between a user and an item means that the user rated the item, and the edge weight is the corresponding rating score. To make recommendations to a user, the recommender system performs a random walk in the user preference graph, where the random walk starts from the user and jumps back to the user with a certain probability (called restart probability) in each step. Aer the random walk converges, each item has a stationary probability that essentially characterizes the closeness between the item and the user. Finally, the system recommends the items that have the largest stationary probabilities to the user.
In our poisoning aacks, an aacker's goal is to promote a target item, i.e., making a graph-based recommender system recommend the target item to as many users as possible. Like most existing poisoning aacks to recommender systems [19] [20] [21] 24] , our aacks inject fake users with carefully craed rating scores to the target recommender system to achieve the aack goal. Due to limited resources and to avoid detection, we assume an aacker can inject m fake users at most and each fake user rates n items at most. For convenience, we call the items, which a fake user rates, the user's ller items. e key challenge is to determine the ller items and their rating scores for each fake user. To address the challenge, we formulate poisoning aacks to graph-based recommender systems as an optimization problem, whose objective function is the hit ratio of the target item (i.e., the fraction of normal users whose recommended items include the target item) and whose constraints are that at most m fake users with at most n ller items can be injected. Solving this optimization problem produces m fake users that maximize the hit ratio of the target item.
However, this optimization problem is computationally intractable because 1) the hit ratio is related to the fake users' rating scores in a very complex way, and 2) the rating scores are integer variables. To address the computational challenge, we propose several techniques to solve the optimization problem approximately. Specically, we approximate the hit ratio using the items' stationary probabilities, which are used to make recommendations in graph-based recommender systems. Moreover, we relax the fake users' rating scores as continuous variables, solve the optimization problem, and then generate ller items and their integer rating scores based on the continuous variables. Finally, we propose a projected gradient descent based method to solve the optimization problem with an approximate hit ratio and relaxed continuous variables.
We evaluate our poisoning aacks and compare them with several existing aacks using two real-world datasets. First, we evaluate the aacks under the white-box seing, i.e., the graph-based recommendation algorithm and its parameter (i.e., restart probability) are known to the aacker. We nd that our aack can eectively enhance the hit ratio of a target item. For instance, when the system recommends 10 items to each user and the number of injected fake users is 1% of the number of normal users, our attack could improve the hit ratio of an unpopular target item by around 580 times. Moreover, our aack is signicantly more eective than existing aacks for graph-based recommender systems. For instance, compared to the poisoning aack proposed by Yang et al. [35] , our aack can improve the hit ratio from 0.0% to 0.4% for an unpopular target item. e reason is that existing aacks are not optimized for graph-based recommender systems. Second, we evaluate the aacks under gray-box seing (the graph-based recommendation algorithm is known but its parameter is unknown) and black-box seing (the recommendation algorithm is unknown). We nd that, in the gray-box seing, even if the aacker does not know the restart probability, our aack can still substantially improve the hit ratios of target items. In the black-box seing, we assume an aacker generates fake users based on a graph-based recommender system, while the target recommender system is based on matrix factorization. Our results show that our aacks can also transfer to matrix factorization based recommender systems.
We also study detecting fake users via supervised machine learning techniques and their impact on the eectiveness of poisoning aacks. Intuitively, the rating scores of fake users are generated in specic ways, and thus it could be possible to distinguish between normal users and fake users using their rating scores. Specically, we extract features from a user's rating scores and learn a binary classier using a training dataset that includes both normal users and fake users. e binary classier is then used to predict a user to be normal or fake. We nd that a small fraction of normal users are falsely predicted to be fake, while a large fraction (20%⇠50%) of fake users are falsely predicted to be normal. e service provider could deploy such a detector to predict fake users and exclude the predicted fake users from the recommender system. We evaluate our poisoning aacks and existing aacks under such scenario. We nd that the poisoning aacks are still eective when such a detector is deployed, and our aack is still more eective than existing aacks. e reason is that a large fraction of fake users are not detected.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We provide the rst systematic study on poisoning aacks to graph-based recommender systems. We formulate poisoning aacks as an optimization problem and propose techniques to solve the optimization problem approximately.
• We extensively evaluate our aacks and compare them with existing aacks using two real-world datasets.
• We study detecting fake users using their rating scores and evaluate the eectiveness of poisoning aacks when such a detector is deployed.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 2.1 Collaborative Filtering
Collaborative ltering based recommender systems have been widely deployed in various web services such as Amazon, YouTube, Netix, and Google Play. Suppose we are given a user-item rating score matrix, where the entry r ui is the rating score that user u gave to item i, e.g., a product on Amazon, a video on YouTube, a movie on Netix, and an app on Google Play. For instance, a rating score r ui can be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, where r ui =0 indicates that u did not rate the item i, 1 means the most negative rating score, and 5 means the most positive rating score. e goal of collaborative ltering is to recommend each user in the user-item rating score matrix N items that the user did not rate before but the user may have interests in, via analyzing the rating score matrix. Depending on the techniques that are used to analyze the rating score matrix, collaborative ltering can be roughly classied to 4 categories, i.e., neighborhood-based, association-rule-based, matrix-factorization-based, and graph-based.
Neighborhood-based, association-rule-based, and matrix-factorization-based recommender systems: Neighborhood-based recommender systems [27] nd neighbors of a user or neighbors of an item in order to recommend items to a user. For instance, to recommend a user items, the methods can rst nd the nearestneighbors of the user, predict the user's rating scores to items based on the rating scores of the nearest neighbors, and recommend the N items that have the highest predicted rating scores to the user. Association-rule-based recommender systems [6, 22] aim to identify frequent co-occurrence between items in user reviews. For instance, if many users give high rating scores to both item A and item B, then there is a certain association between the two items. For a user who gave a high rating score to item A, item B is recommended to the user. Matrix-factorization-based recommender systems [17] assume that the user-item rating score matrix can be explained by a small number of latent factors. Based on the assumption, they use a low-rank matrix to approximate the user-item rating score matrix. e low-rank matrix predicts missing values in the user-item rating score matrix, i.e., for each user, the low-rank matrix predicts rating scores to all items that the user did not rate before; and the N items that have the highest predicted rating scores are recommended to the user. Graph-based recommender systems: In this work, we focus on graph-based recommender systems [7] . Graph-based recommender systems were deployed by several popular web services such as eBay [25, 26] and Huawei App Store [12, 13] in China. e key idea of graph-based recommender system is to model users' preference for items as a weighted bipartite graph G = (U , I, E), namely user preference graph. e two sets of vertex U and I represent the user set and the item set, respectively; an edge (u, i) between a user u 2 U and an item i 2 I represents that the user rated the item; and the weight of an edge (u, i) is the rating score that the user gave to the item. Figure 1 illustrates a user preference graph with an example of 3 users and 3 items.
To generate the top-N recommendation list for a user, the recommender system performs a random walk in the graph, where the random walk starts from the user and jumps back to the user with a probability in each step, where is called restart probability. e stationary probability distribution of the random walk is used User-item ratings User preference graph to rank items and make recommendations. We denote by p u the stationary probability distribution of the random walk that starts from the user u. en, the stationary probability distribution is a solution of the following linear system:
where e u is a unit vector whose uth entry is 1 and all other entries are 0, and the matrix Q is called transition matrix, which is dened as follows:
where x is the set of neighbors of node x. More specically, for a user node x, x is the set of items that were rated by x; for an item node x, x is the set of users that rated x. To solve p u , we start from a random probability distribution and then iteratively update p u as p
u + · e u until convergence. en, we rank the items that were not rated by the user u with respect to their stationary probabilities. e top-N items with the largest stationary probabilities are recommended to the user u.
Attacks to Recommender Systems
2.2.1 Security Aacks. ese aacks aim to spoof a recommender system such that a target item is recommended to as many or few users as possible. Specically, poisoning aacks (also known as shilling aacks) [19, 21, 24] aim to inject fake users with fake rating scores to the system such that a bad recommender system is learnt from the user-item rating score matrix. Prole pollution aacks [34] aim to pollute the rating behavior of normal users to manipulate the recommendations to them. By analogy to adversarial machine learning, poisoning aacks are to manipulate recommender systems at "training time", while prole pollution aacks are to manipulate recommender systems at "testing time".
Poisoning attacks: Poisoning aacks were rst studied more than a decade ago [19, 21, 24] . However, these aacks are heuristicsdriven and are not optimized to a particular type of recommender systems. For instance, in random aacks [19] , given the number of fake users an aacker can inject into the system, the aacker randomly selects some items for each fake user and then generates a rating score for each selected item from a normal distribution, whose mean and variance are calculated from the rating scores in the entire user-item rating score matrix. In average aacks [19] , the aacker generates a rating score for a selected item from a normal distribution, whose mean and variance are computed from the rating scores to the selected item in the user-item rating score matrix.
More recent poisoning aacks [20, 35] generate fake rating scores or behavior that are optimized to a particular type of recommender systems. Specically, Li et al. [20] proposed poisoning aacks to matrix-factorization-based recommender systems. Yang et al. [35] proposed poisoning aacks (they called them fake covisitation injection aacks) to association-rule-based recommender systems, in which each user injects fake co-visitations between items instead of fake rating scores to items. We aim to study optimized poisoning aacks to graph-based recommender systems.
Prole pollution attacks: Xing et al. [34] proposed prole pollution aacks to recommender systems and other personalized services, e.g., web search. eir aacks aim to pollute a user's prole, e.g., browsing history, via cross-site request forgery (CSRF) [37] . With a polluted user prole, the aacker can recommend arbitrary items to the user. ey showed that popular web services including YouTube, Amazon, and Google search are vulnerable to the aacks. However, the limitation of these aacks is that they rely on CSRF, which makes it hard to perform the aacks at a large scale.
Privacy
Aacks. Two aacks, i.e., item inference aacks and aribute inference aacks, were proposed to compromise user privacy in recommender systems.
Item inference attacks: Calandrino et al. [4] proposed privacy attacks to infer the items that a target user has rated before, e.g., such items could be products that the target user purchased on Amazon, music the target user liked on Last.fm, and books the target user read on Librarying. e key intuition of their aacks is that a collaborative ltering recommender system makes recommendations based on users' past behavior. erefore, the recommendations made by a recommender system include information about users' past behavior. Via tracking and analyzing the publicly available recommendations over time, an aacker could infer a target user's past behavior, e.g., the items the user rated.
Attribute inference attacks: A user's rating behavior (e.g., rating scores to items, page likes on Facebook) is essentially statistically correlated to the user's aributes (e.g., gender, political view, sexual orientation, interests, and location). erefore, an aacker could infer a user's private aributes based on its rating behavior via machine learning techniques, which capture the statistical correlations between rating behavior and aributes. Such aacks are called aribute inference aacks [9] and have been demonstrated to be feasible by multiple studies [9-11, 16, 18, 33] . In particular, given a set of users whose rating behavior and aributes are known to an aacker, the aacker learns a machine learning classier which takes a user's rating behavior as an input and predicts the user's attributes. en, the aacker applies this classier to infer aributes of the users who did not disclose their aributes. A notable example of real-world aribute inference aacks is that Cambridge Analytica leveraged Facebook users' rating behavior (e.g., page likes) to infer users' aributes, based on which targeted advertisements are delivered to users [1] . Jia and Gong [15] recently proposed a practical defense against aribute inference aacks via adversarial machine learning. e key idea is to add carefully craed noise to a user's rating behavior data such that the aacker's classier is very likely to make incorrect predictions.
PROBLEM FORMULATION 3.1 reat Model
Attack goal: We consider an aacker's goal is to promote a target item t to as many users as possible. Suppose the system recommends N items to each user. We denote by h(t) the fraction of normal users whose top-N recommendations include the target item aer the aack. h(t) is called hit ratio of the target item t. e aacker's goal is to maximize the hit ratio. We note that an aacker could also demote a target item, i.e., minimize the hit ratio of the target item. However, demotion is a special case of promotion [21, 35] . Specically, an aacker can promote other items such that the target item is demoted in recommendation lists. erefore, we will focus on promotion aacks in this work.
Attack approach: e aacker uses data poisoning aacks to achieve the aack goal. In particular, the aacker injects some fake users to the system. Each fake user gives a high rating score to the target item and well-craed rating scores to certain selected items, which we call ller items. A key challenge for the aacker is to determine the ller items and their rating scores for each fake user. Since normal users oen rate a small number of items, we assume the number of ller items for each fake user is at most n, to avoid being detected simply based on the number of rated items.
Attacker's background knowledge and capability: We assume an aacker has the following background knowledge: 1) the recommendation algorithm used by the given recommender system; and 2) the user-item rating score matrix, which is usually publicly available and can be collected by the aacker. We note that the aacker could also collect a partial user-item rating score matrix for a subset of users and subset of items, and design aacks based on the partial matrix. Our threat model is also known as white-box seing. In our experiments, we will demonstrate that our aacks can also be transferred between recommender systems under the grey-box seing (i.e., the aacker does not know the parameters of the recommendation algorithm) or the black-box seing (i.e., the aacker does not know the recommendation algorithm).
In practice, an aacker oen has limited resources so the aacker can only inject a bounded number of fake users into the system, though the bounded number could still be large. For instance, an aacker could leverage compromised machines to register and maintain fake users. Detecting such fake users is also known as Sybil detection, and many methods (e.g., [8, 28, 32] ) have been developed to detect fake users. For instance, the service provider could analyze the IP addresses of the users to detect fake ones. To avoid such IP-based detection, an aacker oen registers a small number of fake users on a compromised machine. Indeed, omas et al. [29] found that a half of compromised machines under an aacker's control maintain less than 10 fake users in online social networks. More formally, we assume the aacker can inject m fake users into the recommender system.
Attacks as an Optimization Problem
We formulate poisoning aacks as an optimization problem, solving which maximizes the hit ratio of the target item. Let r be the rating score vector of a fake user , where r i is the rating score that the fake user gives to the item i. We consider a rating score is in the set of integers {0, 1, · · · , r max }, where r max is the maximum rating score. For instance, in many recommender systems, r max = 5. A rating score of 0 means that the user did not rate the corresponding item. Essentially, we aim to nd the rating score vector for each fake user that maximizes the hit ratio of the target item. Specically, we nd the rating score vectors via solving the following optimization problem:
where { 1 , 2 , · · · , m } is the set of m fake users, |r | 0 is the number of non-zero entries in the rating score vector r , and n is the maximum number of ller items (the ller items do not include the target item). e hit ratio h(t), which is the fraction of normal users whose top-N recommended items include the target item t, is computed by a recommender system on the entire user-item rating score matrix that includes the m fake users. We note that our formulation in Equation 3 is applicable to data poisoning attacks to any recommender system. In this work, we will focus on graph-based recommender systems.
OUR POISONING ATTACKS 4.1 Overview
A solution to the optimization problem in Equation 3 is a data poisoning aack. However, nding the exact optimal solution to the optimization problem in Equation 3 is computationally intractable (i.e., NP-hard) because 1) the objective function h(t) is related to the rating score variables r ( 2 { 1 , 2 , · · · , m }) in a very complex way, and 2) the variables are integer variables. erefore, we propose techniques to nd approximate solutions to the optimization problem. Specically, to address the computational challenge, we propose several approximation techniques. First, instead of optimizing the rating scores for the m fake users simultaneously, we optimize their rating scores one by one. In particular, given the normal users and fake users we have added so far, we nd the rating scores for the next fake user to optimize the hit ratio of the target item. Second, we approximate the hit ratio h(t) in the objective function using some function that is easier to optimize. Specically, since graph-based recommender systems leverage the stationary probabilities of items to make recommendations, our approximate objective function roughly requires that the stationary probabilities of the target item are high for many users. ird, we relax the rating scores to be continuous variables in the range [0, r max ] and then transform them to integer rating scores aer solving the optimization problem. We propose a projected gradient descent based method to solve the optimization problem with the approximate objective function and relaxed continuous variables.
Approximating the Optimization Problem
Suppose t is the target item that the aacker aims to promote. We add fake users to the recommender system one by one. Assume G = (U , I, E) is the current user preference graph which includes rating scores for both normal users and fake users added so far. S is the set of normal users who have not rated the target item t. We denote the set of top-N recommended items for a user u as L u .
Relaxing rating scores to be continuous variables: We add a fake user to the user preference graph G, where w i is the rating score that the fake user gives to item i. We model w i as the weight of the edge ( , i). For simplicity, we denote by w the vector of weights of edges that connect the fake user and all items. Our goal is to nd the edge weights w that optimize the hit ratio of the target item. Since rating scores are integers, w are integer variables whose values could be 0, 1, · · · , r max . However, such integer variables make the optimization problem intractable. erefore, we relax the variables as continuous variables whose values are in the range [0, r max ], solve the optimization problem using the continuous variables, and transform them to integer rating scores. Note that w i is dierent from r i . Specically, w i is a continuous variable we use to model a rating score, while r i is the nal integer rating score that user gives to item i.
Approximating the hit ratio: Since the hit ratio is related to the edge weights w in a very complex way, which makes the optimization problem intractable, we approximate the hit ratio using the stationary probabilities of random walks, which are used to generate the top-N recommended items in graph-based recommender systems. In the user preference graph with the new fake user , to make recommendations for a normal user u, we rst perform a random walk from u and compute its stationary probability distribution p u , where p ui is the stationary probability for item i. Specically, the stationary probability distribution p u is computed according to Equation 1, where the transition matrix Q is a function of the edge weights w . e recommendation list L u consists of the N items that 1) u has not rated yet and 2) have the largest stationary probabilities. e target item t hits the user u if t is among the recommendation list L u , i.e., if p ut > p ui for a certain item i in the recommendation list L u , otherwise the target item does not hit the user u.
1) Loss function for one user. To approximate the hit ratio, we leverage a loss function l u over the stationary probability distribution for each user u. We aim to design a loss function that satises two goals: 1) for each item i 2 L u , if p ui < p ut (i.e., the target item ranks before the item i), then the loss for item i is smaller, and 2) the loss is smaller if the target item ranks higher in the recommendation list L u . To achieve these goals, we adopt the following loss
Algorithm 1 Our Poisoning Aacks
Input: Rating matrix R, parameters t, m, n, , b. Output: m fake users 1 , 2 , · · · , m . 1: //Add fake users one by one. 2: for = 1 , 2 , · · · , m do 3:
Solve the optimization problem in Equation 6 with the current rating matrix R to get w .
4:
//Assign the maximum rating score to the target item.
5:
r t = r max . 6: //Find the ller items 7: e n items with the largest weights are ller items. 8: //Generate rating scores for the ller items. 9: r j ⇠ N(µ j , 2 j ), for each ller item j.
10:
//Inject the fake user with rating scores r to the system.
11:
R R [ r . 12: end for 13: return r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r m . function:
where (x) = 1 1+exp( x /b) is called the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney loss function [3] and b is a parameter called width. In the machine learning community, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney loss function is known to optimize the ranking performance [3] , i.e., the loss is smaller when the target item ranks higher in the recommendation list in our case.
2) Loss function for all normal users. Our goal is to recommend the target item to as many normal users as possible. erefore, we sum the loss of all normal users as follows:
where S is the set of normal users who have not rated the target item yet.
3) Approximate optimization problem. Recall that, in our threat model, each fake user rates at most n items to avoid detection, which essentially constrains the values of w . Considering this constraint, we propose to solve the following optimization problem:
where kw k 2 2 regularizes w and is used to model the constraint that each fake user can rate a small number of items, while balances the regularization term and the loss function.
Solving the Optimization Problem
We solve the optimization problem in Equation 6 using projected gradient descent. Specically, in each iteration, we compute the gradient of F (w ) with respect to w , move w a small step towards the inverse direction of the gradient, and project each w i back to the range [0, r max ]. We can compute the gradient of F (w ) as 
where it = p ui p ut . e key challenge of computing the gradient is to compute the gradient @p u @w for each normal user u. From Equation 1, we have:
Furthermore, according to Equation 2, we have:
where w x is the discrete rating score that user x gave to the item when x is not the new fake user, and w x is the continuous edge weight to be optimized when x is the new fake user. erefore, Equation 8 is a system of linear equations with respect to @p u @w . We iteratively solve the linear system to obtain @p u @w . Aer solving @p u @w , we can compute the gradient @F (w ) @w .
Generating Rating Scores
Aer solving the weights w , we generate rating scores for the fake user . First, we assume the fake user gives the maximum rating score to the target item. Second, we rank the items according to the weights w i and select the n items with the highest weights as the ller items. e fake user only generates rating scores for the ller items. ird, for each ller item, we sample a number from a normal distribution that is ed to the rating scores that all normal users gave to the item, and then discretize the number to an integer rating score. We only use the weights to select ller items instead of assigning their rating scores, because the weights are approximate values. We generate rating scores for the ller items from such a normal distribution so that the fake user is likely to be similar to more normal users, which makes it more likely to recommend the target item to more normal users.
Algorithm 1 summarizes our poisoning aacks. We generate fake users one by one. For each fake user, we use projected gradient descent to solve the optimization problem in Equation 6 with the current rating score matrix (i.e., the current user preference graph). Aer solving the weights w , we generate rating scores. Specically, N(µ j , 2 j ) at Line 9 is the normal distribution with mean µ j and variance 2 j that are ed using the rating scores that normal users gave to the item j.
EXPERIMENTS 5.1 Experimental Setup

Datasets.
We perform experiments using two real-world datasets, which are widely used for evaluating recommender systems in the data mining community. e rst dataset is MovieLens 100K (Movie) [23] . is dataset consists of 943 users, 1,682 movies, and 100,000 ratings. e second dataset is Amazon Instant Video (Video) [2] , which includes 5,073 users, 10,843 items, and 48,843 ratings. We dene the sparsity of a dataset as follows:
number of ratings number of users ⇥ number of items .
As we will show, the aack performance is related to the sparsity of a recommender system. Table 1 shows the dataset statistics.
Compared Aacks.
We compare our poisoning aacks to several poisoning aacks. In all these aacks, an aacker injects m fake users to the recommender system. Each fake user gives the maximum rating score to the target item and gives certain rating scores to n selected items (called ller items). Dierent aacks use dierent strategies to select the ller items and generate rating scores for them.
Random attack [19] : In this aack, the aacker rst ts a normal distribution for the rating scores in the entire user-item rating score matrix. For each fake user, the aacker selects n items as the ller items uniformly at random. en, for each ller item, the aacker samples a number from the normal distribution and discretizes it to be a rating score.
Average attack [19] : In this aack, the aacker ts a normal distribution for the rating scores of each item. Like the random aack, average aack also samples n items as ller items uniformly at random. However, for each ller item, the aacker generates a rating score from the normal distribution ed for the item. e intuition is that generating rating scores around the average rating scores of ller items could enable the fake users to be more similar to normal users, and thus have a larger eect on the recommendations.
Bandwagon attack [21] : is aack considers item popularity when selecting ller items. We implement a variant of bandwagon aack as follows: for each fake user, the aacker selects n ⇥ 10% items whose average rating scores are high (e.g., 5 in our experiments) and selects n ⇥ 90% items uniformly at random as ller items. For each ller item, the aacker generates a rating score from the normal distribution ed for the entire user-item rating score matrix (like the random aack). e intuition is that the aacker aims to recommend the target item to users who rated the popular items.
Co-visitation attack [35] : is aack was designed for associationrule-based recommender systems. We note that in the original aack, the aacker does not necessarily need to register fake users, because some association-rule-based recommender systems consider visitations from any visitors to make recommendations. In our work, we focus on recommender systems using rating scores and only registered users can provide rating scores. erefore, the aacker injects fake users to the system. Moreover, if a user rates both items i and j, then we say i and j are co-visited by the user. erefore, the aack technique developed by Yang et al. [35] essentially nds the ller items for each fake user. For each ller item of each fake user, we generate a rating score from the normal distribution ed for the item (like the average aack).
Target Items (Random Target Items vs. Unpopular Target
Items). We consider two types of target items. First, an aacker aims to promote a random target item. Specically, in our experiments, we sample an item uniformly at random and treat it as the target item. Second, an aacker could also promote an unpopular item (e.g., a new item that belongs to the aacker). To simulate this aacker, we sample an item that has 5 ratings at most uniformly at random and treat it as the target item. (HR@N) . We use the hit ratio (HR@N) as our evaluation metric. Suppose the recommender system recommends N items for each user. Given a target item, HR@N is the fraction of normal users whose N recommended items include the target item. For both random target items and unpopular target items, we compute the hit ratio averaged over 10 target items.
Evaluation Metric
Parameter Seing.
Without otherwise mentioned, we use the following default parameter seing: the restart probability in graph-based recommender systems is set to be 0.3, = 0.01, b = 0.01, N = 10, and n = 10. Moreover, the number of fake users (i.e., aack size) is 3% of the normal users in the recommender system. By default, we assume graph-based recommender system is used.
Attacking Graph-based Systems
We rst consider the white-box seing, i.e., the graph-based recommender system and its restart probability are known to the aacker. Impact of attack size: Table 2 shows the results for the compared poisoning aacks with dierent aack sizes. e aack size means that the number of fake users is a certain fraction of the normal users, e.g., 1% aack size means that the number of fake users is 1% of the number of normal users. e row in "None" means the hit ratios without any aacks. First, our aack can eectively promote target items. For instance, in the Video dataset, when injecting 1% fake users, the hit ratio of a random target item increases by around 33 times, while the hit ratio of an unpopular target item increases by around 580 times. Second, our aack is signicantly more eective than existing aacks. For instance, in the Movie dataset, when injecting 1% fake users, our aack improves the hit ratio upon the best compared aack by 2.3 times for a random target item, while our aack improves the hit ratio from 0 to 0.0042 for an unpopular target item. e reason is that random aack, average aack, and bandwagon aack are agnostic to recommender systems, while the co-visitation aack was specically designed for association-rule-based recommender systems.
ird, the hit ratio gain is more signicant for unpopular target items than random target items. For instance, our aack improves the hit ratio by 96 times and 1700 times for a random target item and an unpopular target item respectively, when injecting 3% fake users into the Video dataset. Fourth, all aacks are more eective on the Video dataset than the Movie dataset. We speculate the reason is that Video is more sparse, and thus is easier to aack. More specically, when the dataset is more sparse, it is easier to inject fake users that are similar to a large number of normal users. Impact of the number of recommended items: Table 3 shows the hit ratios for dierent aacks when the recommender system recommends dierent numbers (i.e., N ) of items to users, where random target items are used and the aack size is xed to be 3%. First, we observe that our aack is eective and is more eective than the existing aacks for dierent values of N . Second, when N is smaller, the hit ratio gains of our aack over existing aacks are more signicant. For instance, when N = 20 and N = 5, our aack's hit ratios improve upon the best existing aacks by twice and by 9.5 times in the Movie dataset, respectively. is indicates that our aack ranks the target item higher in the recommendation lists than existing aacks. e reason is that the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney loss function [3] adopted by our aacks aims to optimize the ranking performance of the target item.
Impact of the number of ller items: Figure 2 shows the impact of the number of ller items on our aacks for random target items. On the Movie dataset, the hit ratio decreases as the aacker uses more ller items. However, on the Video dataset, the hit ratio increases and uctuates as more ller items are used. erefore, the relationship between the hit ratio and the number of ller items heavily depends on datasets. We note that Mobasher et al. [21] had similar observations for the average and bandwagon aacks. Intuitively, an aacker should be more powerful and achieve beer hit ratios when using more ller items. Our results and previous study [21] show that this intuition does not hold. Understanding such phenomena theoretically is an interesting future work.
Transferring to Other Systems
In the previous section, we assume that the aacker has a whitebox access to the target recommender system. In this section, we consider an aacker has a gray-box and black-box access to the recommender system. In particular, in the gray-box seing, the recommender system is still graph-based recommender system, but the key parameter restart probability is unknown to the aacker. In the black-box seing, the aacker does not know the target recommender system algorithm. To simulate such black-box seing, we assume the aacker generates fake users based on a graph-based recommender system, while the target recommender system uses matrix factorization.
Gray-box setting: e aacker uses a restart probability = 0.3 in graph-based recommender system to generate fake users. Figure 3 shows the hit ratios for random target items of our aacks when the target graph-based recommender system uses dierent restart probabilities. We observe that the hit ratio reaches the maximum when the restart probability is 0.3. e reason is that the aacker also sets the restart probability to be 0.3, which essentially reduces to a white-box aack. When the target recommender system uses a restart probability other than 0.3, our aack is less eective. However, our aack is still much more eective than existing aacks (please refer to Table 2 ).
Black-box setting:
We assume the aacker generates fake users using a graph-based recommender system, while the target recommender system uses matrix factorization. In particular, we use the popular matrix factorization technique proposed in [17] to implement the target recommender system. Table 4 shows the hit ratios of our aacks and existing aacks for random target items. First, all compared aacks can transfer to matrix factorization based recommender systems, especially on the Video dataset. Specically, all aacks signicantly improve the hit ratios of target items upon no aacks on the Video dataset. However, the hit ratio gains on the Movie dataset is less signicant. We suspect the reason is that the Movie dataset is denser and is harder to aack. Second, the dierences between our aack and the existing aacks are small, which means that dierent aacks have similar transferability to matrix factorization based recommender systems. ird, the hit ratio gains of all aacks are less (or more) signicant in the black-box seing than in the white-box seing on the Movie (or Video) dataset (comparing Table 2 and Table 4 ). For instance, on the Movie dataset, our aack improves the hit ratio over no aacks by 3 times and by 20% in the white-box seing and blackbox seing, respectively, when the aack size is 1%. However, on the Video dataset, our aack improves the hit ratio over no aacks by 33 times and 4000 times in the white-box seing and black-box seing, respectively, when the aack size is 1%. is is because matrix factorization is known to achieve beer hit ratios when the dataset is denser [17] . For instance, matrix factorization achieves lower hit ratios than the graph-based recommender system on the Video dataset when there are no aacks. Aer the aacker adds fake users, the target item has dense rating scores and thus it is recommended to many users by matrix factorization. As a result, the poisoning aacks have even more signicant hit ratio gains over no aacks in the black-box seing than in the white-box seing.
DETECTING FAKE USERS
Detecting fake users is closely related to Sybil detection in social networks. Many methods have been developed for Sybil detection. ese methods leverage IP addresses (e.g., [28] ), user behavior (e.g., [32] ), or social relationships between users (e.g., [8, 30, 31] ).
Since we do not have access to IP addresses nor social relationships of users, we explore a behavior based method. In particular, we extract a set of features from a user's rating scores and train a binary classier to classify users to be normal or fake. We will also study the eectiveness of the poisoning aacks when the recommender system has deployed such a detector to predict fake users and has excluded the predicted fake users from the recommender system.
Rating scores based detection: Intuitively, the fake users' rating scores are generated in specic ways, and thus it may be possible to distinguish between normal users and fake users using their rating scores. Indeed, previous studies [5, 21] extracted several features from rating scores to train a binary classier to distinguish between normal users and fake users. We adopt these features in our work. Specically, the features are as follows.
• Rating Deviation from Mean Agreement (RDMA) [5] : is feature measures the average deviation of a user's rating scores to the mean rating scores of the corresponding items. Formally, for a user u, RDMA is computed as follows:
where I u is the set of items that user u has rated, |I u | is the number of items in I u , r ui is the rating score that u gave Table 6 : HR@10 for dierent attacks when the service provider deploys a classier to predict fake users and excludes the predicted fake users from the system. to item i, r i is the average rating score for item i, and o i is the total number of ratings for item i. • Weighted Degree of Agreement (WDA) [21] : is feature is simply the numerator of the RDMA feature, i.e., this feature is computed as follows:
• Weighted Deviation from Mean Agreement (WDMA) [21] : is feature is also based on RDMA, but it puts higher weights on rating deviations for items that have less ratings. e WDMA feature for a user u is calculated as follows:
• Mean Variance (MeanVar) [21] : is feature measures the average variance of a user's rating scores to the mean rating scores of the corresponding items. Specically, the MeanVar feature for a user u is given by:
• Filler Mean Target Dierence (FMTD) [21] : is feature measures the divergence between a user's rating scores, and it is computed as follows:
where I uT is the set of items in I u that u gave the maximum rating score and I uF includes all other items in I u .
For each poisoning aack, the service provider generates some fake users using the aack and labels some normal users as a training dataset. In our experiments, we generate 150 fake users (these fake users could be dierent from the fake users an aacker synthesizes when performing aacks) and sample 150 normal users as the training dataset. en, using the above features, the service provider learns a KNN classier, where K is determined via cross-validation in the training dataset.
Results of detecting fake users: We apply the classiers to detect fake users generated by dierent poisoning aacks. We use False Positive Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR) to measure the detection performance. Specically, FPR is the fraction of normal users that are predicted to be fake, while FNR is the fraction of fake users that are predicted to be normal. Table 5 shows the FPR and FNR when detecting the fake users generated in our experiments in Section 5 under the default parameter seing. We observe that a small fraction of normal users are predicted to be fake. When the service provider excludes the predicted fake users from the recommender system, these normal users won't receive personalized recommendations from the recommender system. e service provider could leverage other methods to recommend items for such users, e.g., the service provider always recommends popular items to them (such recommendation is not personalized). Moreover, the detector misses a large fraction of fake users, i.e., FNR is large. Moreover, the FNR tends to increase as the aacker injects more fake users. A possible reason is that more fake users have more diverse paerns, and thus it is harder to detect them. Attack eectiveness when detector is deployed: Suppose the service provider deploys the classier to detect fake users. In particular, the service provider excludes the predicted fake users from the recommender system. Note that a small fraction of normal users will be excluded from the recommender system, while a large fraction of fake users will still be included in the recommender system. We re-compute the recommended items for each remaining user aer excluding the predicted fake users from the recommender system and re-compute the hit ratios of the target items. e hit ratio of a target item is the fraction of the remaining normal users whose recommended items include the target item. Table 6 shows the hit ratios of random target items for the compared poisoning aacks under the white-box seing. First, we observe that these aacks are still eective in many cases. is is because a large fraction of fake users are not detected. Second, compared to the case where the service provider does not detect fake users, the hit ratios are smaller (comparing Table 6 with Table 2 ). e reason is that a large fraction of fake users are detected and excluded from the recommender system. ird, our aack still substantially outperforms existing aacks.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we propose optimized poisoning aacks to graphbased recommender systems. We show that poisoning aacks to graph-based recommender systems can be formulated as an optimization problem and the optimization problem can be approximately solved by a projected gradient descent method. Via evaluations on real-world datasets, we nd that our aacks can make a target item recommended to substantially more users. Moreover, our aacks are more eective than existing aacks for manipulating graph-based recommender systems. e reason is that existing aacks are not optimized for graph-based recommender systems, while our aacks are. Our aacks can also transfer to other recommender systems under the gray-box and black-box seings. e service provider can detect a large fraction of fake users but also falsely predict a small fraction of normal users to be fake, via using supervised machine learning techniques to analyze the users' rating scores. Moreover, our aacks are still eective when the service provider deploys such a detector and excludes the predicted fake users from the recommender system.
Interesting future works include 1) evaluating our poisoning aacks on real-world graph-based recommender systems, 2) designing optimized poisoning aacks to other graph-based recommender systems (e.g., graph convolutional neural network based recommender systems [36] ), 3) designing optimized poisoning aacks to neural network based recommender systems (e.g., [14] ), and 4) designing defenses against poisoning aacks.
